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Abstract Static security assessment (SSA) is an important
procedure to ensure the static security of the power system.
Researches recently show that cyber-attacks might be a
critical hazard to the secure and economic operations of the
power system. In this paper, the influences of false data
injection attack (FDIA) on the power system SSA are
studied. FDIA is a major kind of cyber-attacks that can
inject malicious data into meters, cause false state esti-
mation results, and evade being detected by bad data
detection. It is firstly shown that the SSA results could be
manipulated by launching a successful FDIA, which can
lead to incorrect or unnecessary corrective actions. Then,
two kinds of targeted scenarios are proposed, i.e., fake
secure signal attack and fake insecure signal attack. The
former attack will deceive the system operator to believe
that the system operates in a secure condition when it is
actually not. The latter attack will deceive the system
operator to make corrective actions, such as generator
rescheduling, load shedding, etc. when it is unnecessary
and costly. The implementation of the proposed analysis is
validated with the IEEE-39 benchmark system.
Keywords Cyber physical power system, Static security
assessment, False data injection attacks, State estimation
1 Introduction
Ensuring the operation security of a power system has
always been a basic yet important requirement. Security
assessment is essential to monitor and control the power
system in near real-time, and also one of the most important
functions of Energy Management System (EMS) [1, 2].
Usually, it consists of static security assessment (SSA) and
dynamic security assessment (DSA). The former one mainly
focuses on branch overflow and bus overvoltage following a
disturbance [3]. The latter onemainly focuses on the stability
criteria (including rotor angle, voltage, and frequency) isCrossCheck date: 20 June 2016
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violatedwhen be subject to a disturbance [4–7]. In this paper,
we focus on the SSA which highly depends on the state
estimation results. Therefore, the accuracy of state estima-
tion result is of high importance for the SSA and the corre-
sponding security enhancement.
Researches recently show that due to the deeper inte-
gration of physical system and cyber system, the security
and economy of the modern power system might be
affected by cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks have already made
destructions to the control system. For example, in 2003, a
cyber-attack penetrated a computer network at the Davis-
Besse nuclear power plant in the U.S. While in 2010, the
Stuxnet worm attacked Iran’s Natanz nuclear fuel-enrich-
ment facility [8]. The ‘‘BlackEnergy’’ worm has been
confirmed of infecting multiple Ukrainian power substa-
tions in December, 2015. Around half of the homes in the
Ivano-Frankivsk region in Ukraine were left without elec-
tricity for a few hours [9].
False data injection attack (FDIA) is a kind of cyber-
attacks proposed by Liu et al. in 2009, which can make
severely secure and economic impacts on the power system
[10, 11]. Then, researches in FDIA-based cyber-attack
have been extensive. Authors in [12] made a comprehen-
sive review of state-of-the-art in FDIAs against modern
power system. Liang et al. in [13] analyzed the physical
consequences of FDIAs on the power system state esti-
mation. Yu et al. [14] proposed a stealthy and blind attack
without the knowledge of Jacobian matrix and any
assumption about the distribution of stat variables. Hug
et al. [15] studied the vulnerability assessment of FDIAs
based on the AC state estimation model. Kim and Tong in
[16] showed that the power system security and economy
can be affected by the combination of topology attack and
FDIA. The authors in [17–19] made their contributions on
the impacts of FDIAs on electricity market, and proposed
that FDIAs can make huge economic losses to the power
market. Yuan et al. in [20] and [21] proposed that FDIAs
can cheat the control center to do unnecessary load shed-
ding to the power system which is a severely destruction to
the system’s economy and security. Yang et al. in [22]
proposed a Polynomical-based compromise-resilient en-
route filtering scheme to filter FDIAs effectively and
achieve a high resilience to the number of compromised
nodes without relying on static routes and node localiza-
tion. Zhao et al. in [23] and [24] proposed a forecasting-
aided implementation method to detect FDIA based on AC
state estimation model. Chaojun et al. in [25] proposed a
new detection method to detect FDIA by tracking the
dynamics of measurement variations. Hao et al. in [26]
proposed an efficient greedy search algorithm to quickly
find subset of measurements to be protected to defend
against FDIAs. Liu et al. in [27] expanded meters from the
power side to the user side, and proposed an intrusion
detection mechanism that can achieve collaborative
detection of FDIA by setting spying domain randomly in
physical memory in combination with using secret infor-
mation and event log. From the literature, few researches
focus on the impact analysis of FDIAs on the power system
SSA. In this paper, we will analysis this problem based on
nonlinear state estimation model which is more practical to
the actual system operation.
As shown in Fig. 1, the security enhancement is imple-
mented to the power system according to the SSA results.
While, the SSA is based on the real-time system modeling
and system monitoring. For modeling and monitoring, three
types of measurements (i.e., the analog measurement, logic
measurement, and pseudo- measurement) are gathered by
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system
and then transferred to other modules in EMS [28]. In EMS,
topology processor is used to estimate the network topology;
observability analysis represents that the power flow equa-
tions are solvable, which depends highly on the available
measurements and their geographic distribution; and state
estimation and bad data detection are used to estimate the
state variables and filter raw data on the basis of redundant
measurements [28]. Onlywhen there is neither inconsistence
between analog measurements and logic measurements, nor
bad data signal shown in bad data detection module, can the
estimated state variables be used in SSA and other higher
layer applications afterwards.
In this paper, we intend to perform security and economy
analysis of the SSA based on nonlinear power system model
under FDIAs with transmission line real power flow over-
load/non-overload situations. We focus on the analog mea-
surement manipulation situation. The manipulation of logic
measurement, pseudo-measurement, and topology infor-
mation is out of the research range of this paper.We intend to
launch a successful FDIA thatwould evade being detected by
the system and cause adverse SSA results compared to the
actual situations. As a consequence, the corresponding
security enhancement implemented by the system operator
might be deceived to do unnecessary actions or do not do
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Fig. 1 Major processes of the online SSA
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The major contributions of this paper are two-folds:
1) Analyze the influences of FDIAs on the SSA and show
that the secure and insecure SSA results can be
manipulated by the attacker;
2) Propose two targeted attack scenarios: fake secure
signal attack and fake insecure signal attack. The
former one is to convert the insecure situations into
secure circumstances, in such a way that the control
center is cheated to not do the necessary actions; the
latter one is to convert the secure situations into
insecure circumstances, in such a way that the control
center is cheated to operate unnecessary actions.
This paper will be organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the basic theoretical background of launching a
valid FDIA against state estimation based on linear and
nonlinear model; Section 3 introduces the models and
solving method of the proposed two targeted attack sce-
narios. Section 4 demonstrates the effectiveness of the
proposed attack on IEEE benchmark system; Conclusions
are drawn in Section 5.
2 Methodologies for FDIAs
In this section, the background of state estimation, bad
data detection, and FDIA theory based on both linear and
nonlinear power flow model are introduced.
2.1 Assumptions and preliminaries
This paper has the following assumptions:
1) The attacker has full knowledge of power topology
information, system parameters, bad data detection
strategy, etc.
2) The attacker is capable of falsifying any analog
measurements that measured by meters.
Note that the above assumptions are commonly accepted
in this research field [10–32], especially when the Ukrai-
nian regional electric power distribution companies expe-
rienced cyber-attacks and caused serious blackouts on 23
December 2015.
2.2 State estimation and bad data detection
The state estimator provides estimated state variables
(i.e., voltage and phase angle on each bus) based on a
combination of meter measurements. The estimated state
variables are the parameters that reflecting the operation
conditions of the power system for a period of time [21].
Consider a power system with nþ 1 buses and m
meters. The state estimation problem is to estimate the state
variables x ¼ ðx1; x2;   ; xnÞTbased on the meter mea-
surements z ¼ ðz1; z2;   ; zmÞT , under the assumption that
the measurement noise e ¼ ðe1; e2;   ; emÞT follows
Gaussian distribution (0 mean and r2 covariance).
In linear power flow model, the state estimation model is
formulated as
z ¼ Hxþ e ð1Þ
where H is the Jacobian matrix, and m[ n. Model (1) is
commonly solved by weighted least squares (WLS) method
by achieving the following optimization problem:
min JðxÞ ¼ 1
2
ðzHxÞTWðzHxÞ ð2Þ
where W ¼ diagfr21 ; r22 ;   ; r2m g. The solution can be
computed in closed-form:
x
_ ¼ ðHTWHÞ1HTWz ð3Þ
where x ¼ ½h_;V_  is the estimated state variable with h_ as
the phase angle and V
_
as the voltage magnitude.
In nonlinear power flow model, hðxÞ is used to denote
the functional dependency between measurements and
state variables. The model is then formulated as
z ¼ hðxÞ þ e ð4Þ
Then the corresponding optimization objective is:
min JðxÞ ¼ 1
2
ðz hðxÞÞTWðz hðxÞÞ ð5Þ
Due to the nonlinear relationship between measurement
variables and state variables, it is difficult to have an
analytical solution. Usually, iterative algorithm is applied
to solve model in (4).
In bad data detection technique, the veracity of the
estimated state variable is detected via the largest nor-
malized residual (LNR) test, where the objective func-
tion JðxÞ is assumed to follow a chi-squared distribution
with at most m n degrees of freedom, shown in Equa-
tion (6). s is the threshold determined by a certain signif-
icance level.
Jðx_Þ\s ð6Þ
If (6) is satisfied, it shows the estimated state variable is
capable of being used in higher layer applications; if not,
the corresponding raw data should be filtered. The
estimator should re-estimate the state variable until (6) is
satisfied.
2.3 False data injection attack
FDIA is studied on both DC and AC model. In the linear
model, the attacker fools the control center mainly by
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keeping the measurement residual unchanged, although the
attacker has injected bad data into meters.
Denoting a as the vector of malicious data which is
injected into the original measurement data z, therefore, the
measurement vector is polluted as zbad ¼ zþ a after attack.
Denoting c as the deviation vector of the estimated state
variable before and after the attack, the estimated state
variable vector after attack can be represented as
x
_
bad ¼ x_ þ c, as shown in (7):
x
_
bad ¼ ðHTWHÞ1HTWzbad ¼ ðHTWHÞ1HTWðzþ aÞ
¼ x_ þ ðHTWHÞ1HTWa ¼ x_ þ c
ð7Þ
The target of the attacker is to find the vector of
malicious data which keeps the measurement residual



































In this way, the attacker can make a successful attack
stealthily without being detected by bad data detection.
FDIA theory based on nonlinear model is much more
complicated because the state variable and observation
value has nonlinear relationship. The estimated state vari-
able is gained through iteration algorithm. Therefore, it is
much more difficult to find an analytical function to
express the relationship between the malicious data and the
system parameters. The key idea of AC model based FDIA
is to find a vector of malicious data that makes the objec-
tive function after attack falls below the threshold as
Jðx_badÞ\s ð9Þ
3 SSA under FDIAs
FDIA is a harmful attack to the secure and economic
operations of the whole power system because the esti-
mated state variable used in all the higher layer applica-
tions in the control center is different from the actual one.
More importantly, the control center will be cheated to
believe the false estimated state variable. As a result, any
operations based on the fake information will be imple-
mented onto the actual system.
In this paper, the attacker’s target is considered to make
confusions of the estimated power flow on transmission
lines based on the estimated state variable. In the SSA, if
the calculated power flow on a transmission line is higher
than the limit, it is considered as an insecure situation. The
system operator should take some corrective actions, such
as generator rescheduling, load shedding, etc. If no signal
shows there is insecure situation of the entire system, it is
considered as a secure situation. So, it is unnecessary for
the system operator to do extra corrective actions. As
shown in Fig. 2, there are four scenarios of the SSA when
applying FDIAs into state estimation.
1) The actual SSA result shows the system is insecure,
while it shows secure after attack;
2) The actual SSA result shows the system is secure,
while it shows insecure after attack;
3) The actual SSA result shows the system is secure,
while it shows secure after attack;
4) The actual SSA result shows the system is insecure,
while it shows insecure after attack;
Apparently, the first and second scenarios are the most
serious situations. We focus on these two scenarios in this
paper and name them as fake secure signal attack and fake
insecure signal attack respectively.
3.1 Fake secure signal attack
In fake secure signal attack, we focus on manipulating
the fault condition into normal circumstance. In this sce-
nario, open circuit fault condition is considered as the base
case and causes overload situation. Shown as the first
timeline in Fig. 3, the fault condition and state estimation
procedure happen between two rounds of OPF. Once the
online SSA shows insecure signal to the control center, the
system operator will take corresponding actions immedi-
ately. However, when under attack, the attacker will
deceive the state estimation and online SSA to show secure
signal instead. As a consequence, necessary operations will
not be taken then.



















Fig. 2 Overview of the main purpose of FDIAs on the SSA
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min ak k0 ð10Þ
s.t. zbad ¼ zþ a ð11Þ
Pij ¼ViGij þ ViVj Gij cos hij þ Bij sin hij
  ð12Þ










Vj Gij sin hij þ Bij cos hij
  ð15Þ
amin\a\amax ð16Þ
½zbad  h hij;Vi;Vj








where the measurement vector under no attack is expressed
as z ¼ ½zPij; zQij; zPi; zQi0 which is composed of the real
and reactive measurements from transmission lines and bus
nodes, i.e., zPij, zQij, zPi and zQi, respectively. The vector
of malicious data is expressed as a ¼ ½zPij; z Qij; zPi; z Qi0
which is the corresponding injection values to the real and
reactive measurements on transmission lines and bus
nodes, i.e., zPij, z Qij, zPi and z Qi, respectively.
Equation (10) is the objective to find the vector of mali-
cious data awithminimumnumber of non-zero valueswhich
means the attackerwillmanipulate lessmeters to achieve his/
her goal. (11)–(15) are the equality constraints; (11) shows
that the vector of measurement used for state estimation is
manipulated as zbad; (12)–(15) are the network equations
with Pij and Qij represent the power flow on transmission
line, Pi and Qi represent the power flow on bus i; hi,hj is the
phase angle on node i; hij ¼ hi  hj; Vi, Vj are voltage
magnitude on node i and node j; Gij and Bij are the real and
imaginary part of admittance matrix on element ij;
Equation (16)–(19) are the inequality constraints; (16) is
the constraint for the vector of malicious data a with amin and
amax as the lower and upper boundary. In practical applica-
tions, the determinations of these boundary values can be
determined by analyzing the historical operation data of the
utility; (17) shows the bad data detection should be satisfied
although the original measurements are manipulated; In
(17), hðhij;Vi;VjÞ ¼ ½Pijðhij;Vi;VjÞ;Qijðhij; Vi;VjÞ;Piðhij;
Vi;VjÞ;Qiðhij;Vi;VjÞ0, Wis a diagonal matrix, s is the bad
data detection threshold; (18) and (19) show that the real and
reactive power flow based on the estimated state variables on
transmission lines should be within limit, with Pijmin, Qijmin,
Qijmax and Qijmax as the lower and upper boundary.
By solving the proposed mathematical model, the
attacker can successfully convert the insecure signal into
secure signal by injecting the malicious data a. Since the
necessary corrective actions are not taken, before operating
the next round of OPF, the physical system may experience
the following two kinds of situations:
Scenario 1: the overloaded transmission lines can sur-
vive for a period of time until the next round of OPF;
Scenario 2: the overloaded transmission lines cannot
survive for a period of time until next round of OPF.
Apparently, scenario 2 is much more dangerous than
scenario 1 because scenario 2 may cause chain reaction so
that the system is pushed to an emergency condition, and
may even cause blackout. As to which kind of influence the
attack will make, depends on the specific network opera-
tion condition.
3.2 False insecure signal attack
In fake insecure signal attack, we focus on manipulating
the normal situation into transmission line overload
circumstance.
Shown as the first timeline in Fig. 4, the system operator
will do nothing until the next round of OPF because the
online SSA sends secure signal to the control center.
However, when under attack, the secure condition is con-
verted into insecure condition. As a consequence, firstly,
the system operator will reschedule OPF immediately;
secondly, based on the real-time monitoring by meters, the
measurement values will be updated as the ones that reflect
the condition after rescheduling. By re-estimating the
system variable and redoing online SSA,if the SSA shows
secure signal, the system operator will do nothing until the
next round of OPF; otherwise, the system operator will
believe that rescheduling is not helpful and will take cor-
responding actions according to the SSA result, mostly it





















Fig. 3 Schematic diagram of fake secure signal attack
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Denoting the state estimation before rescheduling as the
first round of state estimation, and the state estimation after
re-scheduling as the second round of state estimation,
whether the attacker injects malicious data into both rounds
of state estimation depends on his/her purposes. In situation
like this, the attacker will have the following two kinds of
targets.
Target 1: The attacker launches fake insecure signal
attack for the purpose of making the system operator do
unnecessary rescheduling.
The attacker based on target 1 only need to focus on the
first round of state estimation and online SSA. For injecting
the appropriate malicious data that causes rescheduling, the
mathematical model is formulated as
min ak k0 ð20Þ
s.t. Eq:ð11ÞEq:ð17Þ ð21Þ
9Pij[Pijmax; Pij 2 Pijðhij;Vi;VjÞ ð22Þ
where the explanation of (20) and (21) is similar with that
of (10)–(17). (22) represents that as long as there is at least
one calculated power flow out of limit, it is a valid attack.
This model means by injecting the malicious data into
original measurements, the SSA will always show that
there is overloaded circumstance.
Target 2: The attacker launches fake insecure signal
attack for the purpose of making the system operator per-
form unnecessary and costly load shedding.
Load shedding is a costly operation for the power grid.
Usually, when the system is under the insecure situation,
the operator would do re-scheduling to try to solve the
problem. Only when re-scheduling does not work, load
shedding is then taken as an emergency action to avoid the
situation become worse. Different from target 1, target 2
requests the attacker has multiple injections. The attacker
in this scenario not only needs to manipulate before the
rescheduling, but also needs to manipulate after
rescheduling. Normally, the attacker will solve model in
(20)–(22) based on the measurement value after the first
round of OPF, and solve model (20)–(22) again based on
the updated measurement value after the rescheduling.
Shown in Fig. 4, the rescheduling is actually in between
two rounds of OPF, followed by the second round of state
estimation. The attacker should calculate the malicious
data for the first and second round of state estimation based
on the corresponding measurements. Therefore, by multi-
ple injections, the attacker will successfully make the
system take further corrective actions, i.e., load
shedding.
Apparently, target 2 is much more dangerous to the
power system than target 1 because implementing target 2
will cause costly load shedding. Usually, the system
operator chooses to use the power transfer distribution
factors (PTDFs) to determine the load shedding value for
emergency measures. The PTDF is a sensitivity matrix that
represents the sensitivities of branch flows to changes in
nodal real power injections. The mathematical model is
formulated as
min cðDPDÞ ð23Þ
s.t.DPbus ¼ DPD ð24Þ
DPf ¼ HnbrnbDPbus ð25Þ
Pijmin\Pijðhij;Vi;VjÞ  DPf\Pijmax ð26Þ
where DPD is the vector of load shedding value; in (23),
cðÞ represents the cost function of load shedding; usually,
it is a linear relationship between the cost and the load
shedding value; (24) refers to the energy imbalance equa-
tion when shedding load, i.e., the vector of the decreased
injected power DPbus equals to the decreased load value
DPD; (25) is the PTDF sensitivity model for the change in
the real power flow in branches given a unit decrease in the
power injected node, where Hnbrnb is the PTDF sensitivity
matrix, and DPf is the corresponding decreased power
flow; (26) shows that the power flows after load shedding
should still be within limits.
3.3 Solution method
For the proposed fake secure signal attack and fake
insecure signal attack models, intelligence algorithms are
usually used to find the solutions. In this paper, differential
evolution (DE) method is used to solve this problem. DE
method is a simple and efficient heuristic algorithm to
optimize certain properties of a system by pertinently
choosing the system parameters [32]. In this paper, by
applying DE algorithm, we are interested in finding the
appropriate malicious data which will neither lead to sys-
tem unobservable nor be detected by bad data detection

























Fig. 4 Schematic diagram of fake insecure signal attack
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4 Simulation results
In this section, we simulate the problems of FDIAs on
the SSA on the modified IEEE-39 benchmark system. All
simulation programs presented in this paper are imple-
mented on MATLAB using MatPower. The IEEE-39 bus
system has 10 generators and 46 branches. Each trans-
mission line deploys a meter which measures the corre-
sponding real and reactive power flows. The bad data
detection threshold is set to be 70.993 (freedom
m n ¼ 46 2 39; a ¼ 0:05) in this paper. The maxi-
mum power flow on transmission lines is set to be 2 (p.u.).
Table 1 shows the load value used by the OPF dispatch
during this period of time. Table 2 is the DE parameter
setting for solving the problem.
4.1 False secure signal attacks
In the case of fake secure signal attacks, the open circuit
fault condition is assumed to happen on the 30th trans-
mission line in IEEE-39 bus system.
With the demand value provided in Table 1, some of the
actual power flows on transmission lines exceed the limit
because of the fault condition, shown as the orange bar in
Fig. 5. It is clearly seen that the open circuit fault condition
causes overload on transmission line 3 and 25. When under
no attack, the online SSA will immediately react to the
situation and send insecure signal to control center. Then,
control center will take corrective actions.
However, by injecting malicious data into the original
measurements, the overloaded situation is manipulated
within limit shown as the blue bar in Fig. 5. It is clearly
seen that no line is in overload situation. Since the real
power flow overload situation is of the most concern, we
only compare the real power flow on transmission lines in
this paper. Shown in Fig. 6, the orange bar represents the
original real power flow measurements on transmission
lines, while the blue bar represents the corresponding
injection data. Consequently, the control center will do
nothing during this period of time.
4.2 False insecure signal attacks
In the case of fake insecure signal attack, no matter the
attacker’s target is to make system do rescheduling or load
shedding, he/she needs to manipulate the normal situation
to overload situation by solving Equation (20)–Equa-
tion (22) based on the corresponding measurements. For
the IEEE-39 bus system, the original real power flow
measurements on transmission lines before re-scheduling
Table 1 Demand parameters of the IEEE-39 benchmark system
Bus Demand (MW) Bus Demand (MW) Bus Demand (MW)
1 100 14 – 27 70
2 – 15 80 28 50
3 100 16 80 29 70
4 155 17 – 30 –
5 – 18 80 31 50
6 – 19 – 32 –
7 80 20 200 33 –
8 150 21 80 34 –
9 50 22 – 35 –
10 – 23 80 36 –
11 – 24 80 37 –
12 80 25 80 38 –
13 – 26 30 39 100
Table 2 Differential evolution parameter setting for solving the
models
Population size 100
Maximum iteration time 100
F 0.9
Cr 0.1
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Fig. 5 State estimation result with and without attack (fake secure signal attack)
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are the values shown as the orange bar in Fig. 7. Then the
state estimation calculates the corresponding state vari-
ables. As a consequence, the calculated power flow values
are shown as the orange bar Fig. 8. It is clearly seen that
the system is operating in good condition.
However, by injecting malicious data (blue bar in
Fig. 7) into the original real power flow measurement on
transmission lines, the attacker causes fake overloaded
situations shown as the blue bar in Fig. 8. It is clearly seen
from Fig. 8 that the secure situation is converted into
insecure situation with overload situation on transmission
line 27, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41 and 46.
Based on the insecure signal sent by the online SSA, the
control centerwill do rescheduling.As discussed in Section 3,
the attacker calculates themalicious data by solving (20)–(22)
using the updated measurements, then injects malicious data
after rescheduling. Load shedding is then implemented as an
emergency measure. As shown in Table 3, the load shedding
value for the IEEE-39 bus system is displayed, which is also
calculated using DE algorithm. It can be seen from Table 3
that the total load shedding value is 123.65MW.The unit load
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Fig. 8 State estimation result with and without attack (fake insecure signal attack)
Table 3 The load shedding value of the IEEE-39 benchmark system
Bus Value (MW) Bus Value (MW)
1 4.20 21 14.04
2 – 22 –
3 0 23 34.41
4 0 24 2.14
5 – 25 7.65
6 – 26 9.36
7 0 27 20.45
8 0 28 13.06
9 0 29 0
10 – 30 –
11 – 31 0
12 0 32 –
13 – 33 –
14 – 34 –
15 0 35 –
16 5.61 36 –
17 – 37 –
18 0 38 –
19 – 39 0
20 12.71
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Transmission lines
The orignal measurement data














Fig. 6 Measurement data and injection data (fake secure signal
attack)
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Fig. 7 Measurement data and injection data (fake insecure signal
attack)
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takes the power system 3:71 106 $ as the extra increased
cost which is actually unnecessary at all.
5 Conclusions
The cyber-attack is a harmful threat to the security and
economy of modern power system. This paper analyzes the
influences of FDIA, which is a kind of cyber-attack, on the
SSA based on nonlinear power flow model. It shows that
the attacker can make confusions of the secure and insecure
signal to the control center by injecting malicious data into
meter measurements. The system operator is therefore
operating based on the false information which would
make economic losses and may even lead to blackouts.
Therefore, researches on how will cyber-attacks manipu-
late the power system and what influences will cyber-at-
tacks make to the power system would have significant
importance to enhance power system security.
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